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Debating Conviction Against Conviction-
Constitutional Considerations on the
Sanctuary Movement
By RUTI G. TEITEL*
"I had assumed that the welfare of the single human soul was the ulti-
mate test of the vitality of the First Amendment." 1
Democratic principles would prevail. There would be a fair presen-
tation of both sides of the issue, followed by discussion and a vote. A
majority would determine the future of the church-whether it would
join the more than 309 churches, neighborhoods, and communities pro-
viding sanctuary for Central American refugees-in direct contravention
of federal immigration law barring such assistance to illegal aliens.2 The
* Assistant Director, Legal Affairs Department, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. B.S., Georgetown University, 1977; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1980. Special thanks to
Arthur Helton for valuable comments.
1. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a) (1982). The INA is violated by:
Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding officer, agent,
or consignee of any means of transportation who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or
otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the
United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or hav-
ing reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States occurred
less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or
move, within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in further-
ance of such violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts
to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any place, including any building or
any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or in-
duce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of-any alien,
including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not law-
fully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this chap-
ter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty
of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien
in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs: Provided, however. That
for the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal prac-
tices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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stakes were high. Already, somewhere in the courts, sixteen church lead-
ers, having participated in the sanctuary movement since 1981, were now
defending themselves against criminal charges.3
In anticipation of the vote, the church's nave was packed. Members
of the congregation rarely in attendance were present.
Reverend Faire advanced to the pulpit. He was quickly joined by
Rabbi Fine from a neighboring congregation, who had been invited to
lend an ecumenical air to the discussion. Also present on the panel was
Mr. Follows, an attorney with the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice. Other church notables seated in the front, to the side of the pulpit,
included the church's attorney, Mr. Goodwind, and Mrs. Helperson, the
head of the church women's auxiliary volunteers.
"The congregation will come to order," requested the Reverend.
"At issue today is whether our church ought to become a sanctuary.
Because only some of you are familiar with the sanctuary concept,
through a panel presentation we will hear various aspects of the issue,
discuss them, and then put the question to a majority vote."
"Why must we vote?" asked Mrs. Helperson. "Isn't it enough if one
of us thinks it's right?" Mrs. Helperson's question, magnified by the
church acoustics, seemed to have flown up to the church rafters and
lodged itself-hanging for the moment without an answer. But no one
seemed to have heard her. Everyone's attention turned to Reverend
Faire.
"Before we can embark on offering our church as a sanctuary," said
Reverend Faire, "it is crucial that we at the church understand what we
are doing. Otherwise, we will not have assumed the risks and responsi-
bility of our actions. First, you will hear about whether sanctuary is le-
gally justified. As you may know, justification is a defense to criminal
charges.4 Next we will see if this justification is constitutionally pro-
tected-'whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an
3. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
4. The justification defense comprises both necessity and duress defenses. The defense
acquits a defendant of criminal charges if the defendant acted "in the reasonable belief that his
conduct was necessary to prevent some harm to himself or others." See United States v. Agui-
lar, No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC, Defendants' Opposition to Motion to E\clude Necessity De-
fense (D. Ariz. 1986). When, as in sanctuary cases, the defendant seeks to avoid a harm
threatened by human forces-and not natural forces-the defense is characterized as one of
"duress." See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. Contento-Pachon,
723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAl. LAW 383
(1972). The duress defense has three elements: "(1) an immediate threat of death or serious
bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable
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overt act made criminal by the law of the land.'5
"When we provide a sanctuary in our church, we open our doors to
aliens sought by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),"
continued the Reverend. "In so doing, we bring ourselves into open con-
flict with federal law which bars the harboring of aliens. According to
INS statistics, the INS has for some time been treating Central American
aliens as if they were merely economic, not political, refugees. About
ninety-seven percent of Central American political refugee status appli-
cants are routinely sent back.7 By contrast, one of every two applicants
from communist countries regularly obtains political refugee status.8 In
letting ideology determine refugee status, the government is violating ex-
isting immigration law providing for political asylum.9 This is unjust, a
violation of human rights, and of everything else we hold dear. These
refugees are sent back to the turmoil in their homeland and to their likely
deaths. This we cannot countenance.
"Now, here to give you the other side is Mr. Follows, from the
INS."
Mr. Follows, the INS attorney, rose to the pulpit, feeling somewhat
out of place. His heart went out to the plight of the church, and of the
Central American aliens; yet, he was convinced the sanctuary movement
was the wrong approach. He would try to appeal to the congregation's
sense of fairness. "Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today,"
said Mr. Follows. "Like you, I am concerned about the plight of illegal
immigrants. But I am convinced there are ways for you to improve mat-
opportunity to escape the threatened harm." United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at
693. See also United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1982).
The justification defense has been recognized in the United States since the early nine-
teenth century. See, eg., United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No.
14,470); The William Grey, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694).
5. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1982).
7. Status of Salvadorans Debated on Capital Hill, 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 787, 788
(April 27, 1985).
8. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITrEE ON IMMI-
GRATiON AND NATIONALITY LAW REPORT (1984), cited in N.Y. Times, May 6, 1984, § 1, at
21, col. 1.
9. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), provides that a
person who demonstrates a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion.
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" may not be deported
back to the place of persecution. This well- founded fear of persecution standard tracks United
States obligations under international law. For similar language see United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1968)
(entered into force for the United States, Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol
incorporates the terms of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(1951).
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ters by working within the immigration system, as I do, or by criticizing
the system in the media, or in Congress. However, there is no need to
break the law. When you do, you must realize you undermine the whole
immigration system, and you cannot be treated any differently than an
alien smuggling ring."0 Furthermore, in violating our immigration laws
you challenge the rule of law in our country. We are 'a government of
laws and not of men."' '[TIhe Founders knew that Law alone saves a
society from being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power
however disguised." 2
"Now as to our refugees, first, the United States traditionally has
served and continues to serve as a haven for the oppressed. In 1985, in
addition to legal immigrants, we accepted an additional 70,000
refugees. 1 3
"More problematic than the number of refugees is the question of
from where they hail. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides that a person
who demonstrates a 'well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion" 4 may not be deported back to the place of persecution.
This 'well-founded fear of persecution' standard also tracks U.S. obliga-
tions under international law." Raw statistical data, gathered pursuant
to the Refugee Act, indicating a disparity between Central American and
Soviet bloc citizens to whom refugee status is granted, 16 must be put in
proper perspective. It may well be that the intentional, individual polit-
ical persecution proscribed by the Refugee Act is better suited to describe
the communist bloc; however, this is not to say there is no human suffer-
ing in El Salvador or Guatemala. For this purpose, the Refugee Act is an
inadequate gauge. To the extent this is the basis for the sanctuary move-
ment's confrontation with the Administration, it is misdirected. The
Refugee Act was passed by Congress-if you feel the Act is inadequate
to accurately measure comparative 'need for rescue' then it is to Con-
gress you must turn your attention.
"Congressional action aimed at ensuring nondiscriminatory applica-
tion of the Refugee Act of 1980 seeks to obviate the need for case-by-case
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (text reprinted supra note 2).
11. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
12. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258. 308 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
13. Helton, Second-Class Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1985, § 1, at 27, col. 2.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
15. See Protocol, supra note 9.
16. Two to three percent of all applications filed by Central Americans are granted, com-
pared to over forty percent of applications by Soviet bloc citizens. See Helton, Political Asylun
Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. RmF. 243, 253 (1984).
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hearings and proposes that 'Extended Voluntary Departure' (EVD) sta-
tus"7-temporary relief granted at the Attorney General's discretion-be
afforded to Central American refugees. EVD status is now being granted
to refugees from Lebanon, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Poland. Such sta-
tus would permit Salvadorans and Guatemalans to stay in the United
States on a temporary basis until the turmoil in their countries subsides.
Currently, there are measures pending in Congress, for example, the
Moakley/DeConcini bill, 8 which recommend that the U.S. temporarily
suspend the deportation of Salvadorans from this country as long as the
conditions causing them to leave persist.
"Given the congressional alternatives," Mr. Follows continued,
"and the Service's adherence to due process in these cases, the sanctuary
movement cannot claim the INS is acting outside the law. It also cannot
claim that the movement's only recourse is to violate the law. Alterna-
tives exist. The sanctuary movement is therefore not justified in its ac-
tions. It is simply violating the law-in the same way alien smuggling
rings do.
"Furthermore, religious beliefs do not provide you with a blanket
exemption from federal laws, regardless of whether they concern paying
taxes,19 or following federal anti-discrimination laws2" or minimum wage
standards.21 For instance, in the area of immigration, hundreds of mar-
riages conducted by the Rajneesh which were intended to admit illegal
aliens were recently found fraudulent and unlawful.22 Providing sanctu-
ary for fleeing refugees in the name of religion is no more lawful than
bombing abortion clinics in the name of God. 'Every citizen [may not]
become a law unto himself.' "23
"Mr. Goodwind, as our church's attorney, will you respond?" asked
the Reverend.
17. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
18. S. Res. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
Senator Dennis DeConcini and Representative Joe Moakley have introduced legislation, S-377
in the Senate and HR-822 in the House, to grant temporary "extended voluntary deportation"
(EVD) status to political refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua. The suspension would
extend for a period of two years to allow time for a General Accounting Office investigation
and report on the conditions of the displaced persons. The legislation passed the House in the
99th Congress, second session, but it was dropped in conference. It is expected to be revived in
the next session.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
971 (1984).
20. See, eg., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
21. See, e.g., Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
22. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1985, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
23. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
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"We disagree both as to the status of the law, and as to our own
status," said Goodwind. "First, we contend the Administration is violat-
ing its own immigration laws. Refugee statistics reflect, contrary to the
politically-neutral process mandated by the Refugee Act of 1980,24 that
State Department '[i]deology ... continues to dominate asylum decision
making.' 25 The next question is what may we do in the face of this un-
lawfulness. We believe there are no alternatives to sanctuary.
"The present unlawful application of the Refugee Act of 1980 will
not soon be changed.26 Other than to pass legislation granting 'extended
voluntary departure' status, the only way to change present asylum pol-
icy would be to reform the immigration process in order to depoliticize it.
Further proposals for immigration reform, and specific congressional
asylum proposals such as Moakley/DeConcini do not have much chance
of success.27
"The government is also violating constitutional law governing
criminal procedure," continued Goodwind, the church's lawyer. "The
government prosecuted the sanctuary cases28 in a discriminatory man-
24. The Refugee Act of 1980, providing asylum protection to all persons who are unable
or unwilling to return to their native countries "because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion," prescribes a standard which is politically neutral. In theory, it
differs from prior refugee standards which were a function of the political nature of the govern-
ment from which the refugee hailed. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of United
States law regarding political asylum, see Helton, supra note 16. Prior to 1968, there were
three different procedures by which aliens could seek refuge in the United States. Under two
procedures, that of "conditional entry" and the exercise of the Attorney General parole power,
the admission of refugees in practice was determined by ideology and geography. Both were
used to allow refugees chiefly from communist countries.
After the adoption of the United Nations Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 9, the United States committed itself to the politically neutral terms of the Protocol, which
made no reference to ideology or geography. INS failure to follow the politically neutral terms
of the Protocol prompted subsequent adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980, providing expressly
for refugee protection under United States law without regard to ideology or geography. See
Helton, supra note 16, at 250-52.
25. Helton, supra note 16, at 253.
26. The reasons are imbedded in the process. The reliance on the Department of State
advisory opinions by the immigration authorities implementing the Refugee Act to determine
whether the applicant's fear of persecution is "well-founded," ensures that the process will be
determined by United States foreign policy considerations and therefore N ill not be politically
neutral. See Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 9Sth Cong., 1st Sess.
107-10 (1983) (statement of Arthur C. Helton, Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers
Comm. for Int'l Human Rights).
27. See supra note 18.
28. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Merkt, 764
F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); United
States v. Aguilar, No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1986); American Baptist Churches v.
[Vol. 14:25
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ner. Infiltration of the church by informers, without obtaining prior judi-
cial warrant,29 failed to meet even the minimum due process standards
accorded first amendment interests. 3
0
"Given the unlawful situation and the lack of alternatives, 3 1 we be-
lieve that under the common-law principle of justification,32 we are per-
mitted to violate the law. Moreover, because we are a church we believe
this justification principle is constitutionally protected.33 We need not
follow a law contrary to our convictions.34 I'll defer to the Reverend on
Meese, No. C-85-3255-RFP (N.D. Cal. filed May 7, 1985); United Presbyterian Churches v.
Meese, No. 86-0072-PHX-CLH (D. Ariz. 1986).
29. United States v. Aguilar concerned the use of informants equipped with recording
devices in a church as an investigative technique against congregations involved in the sanctu-
ary. No warrant was obtained prior to the use of this law enforcement technique. Under the
Constitution, judicial control of informants to infiltrate a church is necessary to protect reli-
gious freedom. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause); amend. IV (Warrant Clause);
amend. V (Self-Incrimination Clause). Accordingly, in the absence of such judicial supervi-
sion, the case presents the issue of whether the evidence might be suppressed.
30. See, eg., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); see generally Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. REv. 18 (1970).
31. See Rowe, Murder by Deportation, WASH. MONTHLY, Feb. 1984, at 13-22. A show-
ing of absence of alternatives is an element both of the duress defense, see supra note 4, and an
implied element of the first amendment free exercise claim which requires the making out of
governmental compulsion. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). United States
v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985), holds that such compulsion exists in the sanctu-
ary claim.
32. See supra note 4.
33. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (discussing "whether religious
belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land").
34. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (excuse of criminal conduct recognized
with the exercise of religious freedom); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577 (citing
Yoder); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
In Elder, the district court recognized a compelling free exercise interest in sanctuary.
The court applied the two-part test recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy,
106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). At issue is whether the law involves governmental compulsion-
whether the law burdens the free exercise of religion.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
Id. at 2166 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)). The second part of the test is also stated by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence in Bowen: "Once it has been shown that a governmental regulation burdens the
free exercise of religion, 'only those interests of the highest order and not those otherwise
served can over-balance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.'" Id. (quoting Yoder,
406 U.S. at 215).
Variously stated, once a compulsion is shown, the government must show that its regula-
tion stands as written-that it represents "the least restrictive means of achieving some com-
pelling state interest." Id. at 2167 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The test has been applied to sanctuary.
In Elder, the district court found a free exercise compulsion, and went on to find that the
government's interest was such that the application of the immigration laws had to be uniform.
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this point."
"The act of providing sanctuary comports with our longstanding
church traditions," said the Reverend. "Since Biblical times, we have
been commanded to treat our neighbors as we would ourselves. 'When a
stranger sojourns with you in your land, you shall not do him wrong.
The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among
you, and you shall love him as yourself: for you were strangers in the
land of Egypt... 2'1 Moreover, ever since Constantine's Edict of Toler-
ation, issued in 303 A.D., and particularly during the Middle Ages,
under Canon law, the church has provided refuge for certain criminals.36
Accordingly, if we act, we act out of our religious motivations.37 These
convictions are broad-based and cut across sectarian lines, do they not,
Rabbi Fine?"
At the Reverend's prompting, the Rabbi joined him at the podium.
"Of course, there is also a basis for sanctuary in the Jewish tradi-
tion," said the Rabbi. "Yet, just as the principles discussed by Reverend
Faire, they bear little resemblance to today's sanctuary movement. We
too rely on the general Biblical injunctions concerning the treatment of
the 'stranger in our midst.' In addition, we have the 'Levitical cities of
refuge,' the ostensible models for the sanctuary movement. These cities
were established as havens for those guilty of involuntary homicide-to
offer a place where they might flee their avengers. The Levitical cities,
therefore, like the sanctuaries created under Canon law, were for certain
The only court of appeals which has dealt with the issue, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), rejected the free
exercise compulsion-and found sanctuary not to meet the first element of the test. There was
no compulsion, the court held, because the sanctuary workers had alternatives. "Whether
such [religious] motivation, in turn, required defiance of the nation's border control laws... so
as to inhibit and punish appellants burdened their religious practice, is another matter." Id. at
956.
The Merkt court's line of inquiry was in error. In Bowen, the Court accepted the claims
of Little Bird of the Snow Roy- concerning her inability to have a social security number-
notwithstanding that other members of the family, also Native Americans of the same religion,
had social security numbers. In sharp contrast, the Merkt court evaluated the nature of
Merkt's free exercise beliefs by comparing it to that of other Christians. See 794 F.2d at 956.
The Merkt case suggests that courts may be uncomfortable with free exercise claims by those
of majoritarian or large minority religions, such as Catholicism, for fear of the number of
exceptions which will become necessary. Cf Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2167 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). The problem is multiplied by the progressively more ecumenical nature
of the sanctuary movement. See Project on the Sanctuary Movement, Ecumenical, Municipal
and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 553
n.248 (1986). This numbers game goes a long way toward explaining the relative good fortune
of the Amish and the American Indians in bringing free exercise claims.
35. Leviticus 19:33-34 (revised standard).
36. See Brink, Sanctuary and the Sanctuary Movement, THIS WORLD 4 (1985).
37. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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types of fleeing criminals.38 Aside from these rather tangential religious
bases, is our historical experience of needing havens when we were polit-
ical scapegoats. Ultimately, that history is the primary reason we sup-
port offering sanctuary."3 9
The historical exegesis caught Reverend Faire off guard. "Rabbi
Fine has confused this issue somewhat," noted the Reverend. "We are
asking to be treated differently because of our religious convictions or
purpose.' Empathy for political scapegoats will not do, or else we
would be regarded as everyone else. '[T]o have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.'4 ' Can we
at least agree on the 'golden rule' shared by most religions?"42
A stir among the congregants.
"But then let us get on to the more difficult question-the church's
criminal liability under federal law. Here to explain this is our attorney,
Mr. Goodwind."
"Thank you, Reverend," said Mr. Goodwind. "I must say-the last
interchange between you and the Rabbi unsettled me. Our only way to
overcome the criminal charges resulting from violation of immigration
law is to claim a constitutional first amendment free exercise exemption
on the ground that our 'deep religious conviction'43 compels us to pro-
vide refuge. Under the United States Constitution, we cannot be put in
the position of choosing between the dictates of our conscience and those
of the state.' Without this religious basis, we have no argument for an
exemption, and would simply be in the position of violating the law. For
this we would be prosecuted."
38. See R. FEEN, SANCTUARY: A LOOK AT CHURCH TRADITION, RELIGION AND DE-
MOCRACY 1, 3 (1985).
39. Statement of Elie Wiesel, Inter-American Symposium on Sanctuary (Jan. 1985); State-
ment of President Franklin Roosevelt (1944), reprinted in R. FALK, G. KOLKO & R. LIFrON,
CRIMES OF WAR 77 (1971) ("hide these pursued victims, help them to get over their borders,
and do what [we] can to save them .... We call upon the free peoples of Europe and Asia
temporarily to open their frontiers to all victims of oppression.").
40. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
41. Id. at 215.
42. The Golden Rule asks an individual to treat others as he would like to be treated. In
the Jewish religion, it dates back to the writings of Hillel in the first century BCE: "Do not do
unto others as you would not have them do unto you." Mishnah (Shabbat 312). The rule was
restated by Jesus: "So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is
the meaning of the law [Torah] and the prophets." Matthew 7:12 (revised standard). Confu-
cius similarly declared in the Fifth Century BCE "[w]hat you do not like when done to your-
self, do not do unto others." The Analects 12:12.
43. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
44. See, e.g., id. at 218; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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Reverend Faire returned to the pulpit, saying, "What we seek to do
is to tell the Administration that their implementation of the law is un-
just, and that they may not continue to distinguish among refugees. Our
church teachings compel us to object. Once we give shelter to a refugee,
we will notify the Attorney General and the newspapers so that they
know that we have joined the Movement."45
Mr. Goodwind responded, visibly discomfited. "The question is
what the church is compelled to do. Is it compelled by religion to save
lives or is it compelled to tell the Administration its laws are unjust? Is it
rescue or civil disobedience?"
Reverend Faire began to look worried, and said, "But it's both.
They are not inconsistent. As Thoreau said, 'It is not desirable to culti-
vate a respect for the law, so much as for the right.'4 6 Telling the Ad-
ministration their laws are unjust is merely another method to save
lives-in the long run, more will be saved than in a secret operation.
Why can't we do both?"47
I Mr. Goodwind responded that "the publicity surrounding the offer
of sanctuary and the notice to the Administration begin to look political,
even if they are religiously motivated. Even the act of harboring refugees
looks political. But then few religious acts don't have political overtones.
The Jehovah's Witness' failure to say the pledge of allegiance although
religiously motivated could also be regarded as political."8 And, more
recently, the Administration characterized the wearing of a skullcap by
an Orthodox Jewish Army psychologist-as an act designed to foster
'separateness'-a political statement rather than a religious practice.49
This characterization was accepted by the Supreme Court.50 There may
be no way for us to avoid charges of politicking."
Reverend Faire again returned to the podium and said, "Mr. Good-
wind, this is how I see it. We want to save lives, thus we decide to pro-
vide sanctuary; with this public action we simultaneously inform the
45. See Korn, Hiding in the Open, THE STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 19S6, at 28.
46. H. THOREAU, THE VARIORUM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 33 (1967).
47. Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (striking a religiously based objection to the
state's use of social security numbers in its benefit programs). Bowen illustrates the difference
between a free exercise challenge to governmental actions and a free exercise challenge to
governmentally required individual actions. The case stands for the need for governmental
compulsion. The religious objection may not merely be an objection to a governmental pro-
gram. Id. at 2152.
48. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271 n.9 (1981) (speech about religion cannot be distinguished from prayer); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
49. See Brief for Respondents, at 35, in Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
50. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
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Administration that the present situation is untenable, that the laws are
unjust, and that they must be changed. Why can't we do both?"
Mr. Goodwind, shaking his head from side to side, replied, "We
can-only if we are compelled for religious reasons to do both. If not we
will violate a law in protesting its unjustness, and we may be guilty of
civil disobedience-thus we must prepare to accept the penalty.51
Now the Reverend's head was shaking. "Our religion makes us do
both. The options are intimately related. Besides, so long as we are sin-
cere, the government may not second-guess us as to the tenets of our
religion. 2 Further, religiously motivated acts, as well as beliefs, have
been upheld by the courts, even when the acts violate criminal law."53
"That's true," replied Mr. Goodwind, "but only in a very few cases.
Conflicts between religious interests and the law have generally favored
the latter. Regardless of whether the state interest was against polyg-
amy, 4 against child labor,55 protecting public health56 and national se-
curity, 7 eliminating discrimination,58 or enforcing the social security tax
system, 59 all have overridden free exercise claims. The few exceptions
have concerned the Amish school children in Wisconsin v. Yoder,6" and
the conditioning of government benefits on religious beliefs in three cases:
Bowen v. Roy,61 Thomas v. Review Board,62 and Sherbert v. Verner.63
"Most of these Supreme Court decisions are arguably distinguish-
able from sanctuary in that they didn't involve violations of law, but
merely deprivations of benefits as a function of conduct determined by
51. See, e.g., United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 970 (1973). When speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms.
52. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation."); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1578 (S.D. Tex. 1985)
("The Court... is not an arbiter of canon law.").
53. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exemption from mandatory state
attendance laws); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(exemption from state ban on the use of peyote).
54. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
55. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
56. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
57. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986).
58. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See also Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 54 U.S.L.W. 4860 (1986) (holding no church free exer-
cise right to be free from employment discrimination regulation).
59. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
60. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
61. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
62. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
63. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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religious belief. However, it could be argued that the withdrawal of a
benefit is comparable to the imposition of a government penalty.
64
"Regarding the Yoder case, the only persons to benefit from that
decision seem to have been the Amish. The Yoder Court appeared to
treat the Amish specially because of the tradition posed by their religion.
Why, they've been around since the Founders-so they had to be entitled
to a constitutional exemption.6" The same is true of the Native Ameri-
cans in Bowen. 66 Now, sanctuary has an even more ancient tradition,
dating back to Biblical times. So you could say we are like the
Amish....
"Let's assume we have a religious compulsion here. It would over-
ride all other state interests unless the government can show that barring
a sanctuary church exemption is essential to achieving a compelling state
interest. However, accommodation of religion would still be required if
the compelling state interest may be achieved by less restrictive means.67
This is where a difference between Yoder and sanctuary is likely. United
States v. Lee, 68 a more recent case denying the Amish a social security
tax exemption, suggests that Yoder was a truly special holding-the
Amish don't always win. In Yoder, accommodation of the Amish reli-
gious interest did not prevent accomplishment of the compelling state
interest.69 The government's interest in Yoder--educating children-ar-
guably was being effectuated through the Amish alternative of informal
vocational education.70 By contrast, in the instant case, there may be no
less restrictive alternative. The government claims it has an interest in a
uniform application of its immigration laws. 7 1 Arguably, if even one ex-
64. See id. at 404.
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (Christmas dis-
play tradition); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative chaplaincy tradition);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (church tax exemption tradition); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ("Blue Laws" tradition).
66. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
67. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); see also United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
68. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
69. See id. at 257-58.
70. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225, 236.
71. See infra note 89. This interest in the uniform application of immigration laws was
recognized in United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985), concerning the
sanctuary movement. In Elder, the government had to show why the interest in immigration
mandated that there be no exceptions-that the laws be uniformly applied. Id. at 1579. The
Court considered the system to be the "least burdensome method" to accomplish the govern-
ment's purpose of "securing the Nation's borders." Id. Other nonsanctuary cases have recog-
nized the compelling interest of enforcement of our immigration laws but without
consideration of whether the laws must be uniform-i.e., admit of no exception. See Goldman
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emption is granted, the immigration law's objectives are jeopardized.72
"When we protest neutral laws applicable to all citizens, we have an
uphill battle. Courts have been unwilling to provide exemptions based
on religion or conscience, especially where Congress has remained
silent."
73
"How can we go against Congress?" piped Mrs. Helperson, head of
the women's auxiliary. "Aren't they the voice of the majority?"
"Well," responded Mr. Goodwind, "sometimes Congress does af-
ford exemptions based on conviction, for example, in the case of consci-
entious objectors.74 Where Congress fails to do so, the Court, in some
instances, may grant an exemption; yet only in a very few cases has the
Court gone beyond Congress.75 However, had Congress enacted these
exemptions, they might not have withstood Court scrutiny, because of
their potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
76
"When the state involves itself in accommodation of religious inter-
ests, this involvement may threaten other first amendment concerns pro-
tected by the establishment clause mandate.77 Pursuant to the
v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986) (where ostensible national security needs are at
issue, Court defers to government's claim for uniformity); Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1578-79.
72. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60 (no principled way to make individual
exceptions to certain comprehensive national laws).
73. See id. at 263 n.3.
74. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); cf Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (providing release time from compulsory attendance for students to receive outside
religious instruction).
75. Some examples include the Court's provision of exemption of the Amish from com-
pulsory attendance laws, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and the exemption for
Sabbath observers in unemployment compensation schemes, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
76. The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CoNST. amend I. In all of the
cases cited supra note 75, the Court addressed the tension between the establishment and free
exercise interests and resolved the tension in favor of the latter. In Thomas, the Court recog-
nized that the challenged practice "reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of reli-
gious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409). "[T]he danger that an exception
from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause... cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to
the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21.
An example of an effort by a state legislature to protect a free exercise-Sabbath observer
right, held by the Supreme Court to be in violation of the Establishment Clause, is Thornton v.
Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985). Animating the decision seemed to be the Court's concern with
discrimination in favor of Sabbath observers, as against nonbelievers. Id. at 2918 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
77. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21.
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Establishment Clause, government-legislated accommodations may be
considered to be religiously discriminatory, i.e., preferential to the Amish
or to Sabbatarians.78 In contrast, we believe a government accommoda-
tion or exemption for church sanctuary, which on its face may seem to be
preferential to churches by removing government regulation, is ulti-
mately required so as to minimize government involvement in religion
and hence the risk of establishment.79
"Aside from the potential first amendment establishment problems
with an exclusively religious accommodation of sanctuary, at issue is
whether the government's interest in the application of its immigration
laws allows any exemption. Mr. Follows, here from INS, will enlighten
us."
"Laws uniformly applicable to all," began Mr. Follows, "such as the
draft and tax laws, have been upheld without a constitutional right to
exemptions. s° Government claims of the need for uniformity and even
claims of administrative convenience have outweighed those of religious
conscience.8' Happily our insistence on uniformity ultimately helps pre-
serve your religious liberty. Policing for fraud could excessively entangle
the government in matters of religious conscience. '82
78. See, e.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2919 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (upholding church tax ex-
emption); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding uniform social security
taxes); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (draft exemption by legislative
grace only); Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (denying tax deduction for
military expenditure based on religious objections to war); United States v. Malinowski, 472
F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1973) (war taxes). But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
81. See Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985) (four dissenters would uphold drivers
license photo requirement over religious claims); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
82. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 221-22. There are two concerns. One is the extent of the Court's inquiry into the
centrality of an applicant's religious tenet. See Galanter, Religious Fredoms in the United
States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 274-78.
In addition to the "extent of the inquiry" concern is the potential discrimination issue. As
declared by Justice Stevens in United States v. Lee:
In my opinion, the principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against such
claims is not a matter of administrative convenience. It is the overriding interest in
keeping the government-whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the busi-
ness of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that gov-
ernmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring
one religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed
to preclude.
455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g.. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851
(5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (holding that a drug user could be
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Mr. Goodwind rose to rebut and said, "I disagree. The putative
uniformity need simply stems from the government's unwillingness to
determine the validity of claims to religious exemptions.8 3 Fraud might
be a special problem where exemptions are likely to be sought by others
for reasons other than religious.8 4 But this is not relevant here. While
there are profitmaking alien smuggling rings, distinguishing between
these and the sanctuary movement hardly requires government interven-
tion. To the contrary--churches have gone out of their way to put the
government on notice of their religious intentions.
"Remaining only is the question of whether a uniform application of
our immigration laws will be deemed a compelling governmental inter-
est." Unfortunately, if the Court has already found a 'substantial inter-
est' in 'crowd control' at a state park, 6 a fortiori, the government's
interest in policing our borders will be deemed compelling.
"Hasn't the Court already so held, Mr. Follows?" questioned Mr.
Goodwind.
Mr. Follows returned to the pulpit answering, "Yes, in many
cases.8 7 Our immigration laws admit of no accommodations, and the
convicted regardless of whether use was part of a religious practice-based on ostensible fear
of fraudulent assertions).
83. See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2156 (1986) ("a policy decision by a government
that it wishes to treat all applicants alike and that it does not wish the same involved in case-
by-case inquiries into the genuineness of each religious objection to such condition or restric-
tions is entitled to substantial deference."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2157-58, 2167; Thornton v. Caldor, 105 S. Ct. at 2918
n.9.
85. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58.
86. See Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
87. At this time only one reported case has dealt with a sanctuary free exercise defense
and the government's counterbalancing interest in protection of the borders of the United
States. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). While there are other
cases evaluating the importance of government interests in immigration policy, Elder is signifi-
cant because it is the decision which balances the importance of the government's interest in
protecting its borders with the free exercise interests of those in the sanctuary movement. The
decision does recognize the free exercise interest of those in the movement-holding that
Elder has met his burden to demonstrate that religious beliefs motivated his conduct. Even as
it recognizes the sanctuary free exercise interest, the Elder decision holds the government's
interest in policing its borders to be ultimately more compelling, for the court goes on to find
that "implementation of the immigration laws represents an important Government interest
which, on balance, justifies enforcement of § 1324(a)(2) against Elder." Id. at 1580.
Elder is the first case balancing a constitutional free exercise interest with the govern-
ment's immigration interest. The importance of the immigration interest is analogized to a
national security concern. Id. at 1578-79. Characterization of the immigration interest as one
of national security in Elder appears to trigger judicial deference to Congress and the INS-
and an attendantly lower standard of protection of individual constitutional interests. Cf
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (deferring to military interest in uniformity
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government's interest in enforcing the immigration laws is compelling.
The immigration of illegal aliens to this country has rendered our na-
tional borders irrelevant. The problem is overwhelming. The number of
illegal aliens is difficult to estimate but is expected to be greater than
three million."8
"Justice Powell has recently described the substantial governmental
interest in the enforcement of immigration laws to curtail illegal immi-
gration: 'We have noted before the dimensions of the immigration
problems in this country .... Recent estimates of the number of illegal
aliens in this country range between 2 and 12 million .... Clearly the
government interest in this enforcement technique is enormous.' "89
"Thank you, Mr. Follows. Any questions?" asked the Reverend.
"I don't understand what's going on," clamored Mrs. Helperson.
"First, you tell us we must vote to decide if we should become a sanctu-
ary. But how can we ignore the immigration laws and Congress? If
Congress' vote doesn't matter . . . why are we voting here? Isn't it
enough if one of us believes the law is unjust to decide in favor of sanctu-
ary? Doesn't '[a]ny man more right than his neighbors constitute a ma-
jority of one?' "o
Reverend Faire rose and responded, "Of course, Mrs. Helperson,
you and yours may always try offering your own home as sanctuary. But
there are limits. An individual cannot always define his or her religious
freedom.91 Here we are debating what this church should do. Since we
all belong to this church we must all vote. This is a democracy."
"But," Mrs. Helperson declared, "the church is part of the coun-
try-and subject to its laws, laws for which we voted-at least indirectly.
That is also democracy. How can we have it both ways?"
over individuals' free exercise right). In so doing, the Elder court relied on the line of cases
where the Supreme Court rejected free exercise challenges to government regulation because of
some harm to the "public safety, peace, order or welfare." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
230 (1972). See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
88. See J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 111 (1983).
89. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 222 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). See United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 (1975) ("tide of illegal aliens ... massive lawlessness") (Burger,
C.J., concurring); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046-50 (1984); Sure-Tan v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-94 (1984); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 458 U.S. 858, 864
(1982); cf. R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 36 (1984) (regarding historical international concern with the regulation of im-
migrant refugee populations).
90. H. THOREAU, supra note 46, at 41.
91. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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"There is a clash," said the Reverend. "But no matter the end, the
means will draw our country's attention to the refugee plight.
"Now then, let us vote."

